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TOWARD A SPECIFIC INTENT REQUIREMENT IN WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME STATUTES: HOW THE PATIENT PROTECTION 
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 SHEDS LIGHT ON THE 
“GENERAL INTENT REVOLUTION” 
Elizabeth R. Sheyn∗ 
Abstract 
The recent passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
of 2010, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010 (collectively, ACA), has altered the landscape of health 
care and health insurance. However, it has also served to highlight the 
revolution in the intent requirement for white collar crimes. In 
particular, the ACA lowers the intent requirement for several health care 
fraud statutes from “specific intent to defraud” to “general intent to 
deceive,” which is consistent with federal courts’ recent trend of not 
requiring proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the law before finding 
a violation of a particular statute proscribing a so-called “white collar 
crime.” In contrast to some of the ACA’s other substantive provisions, 
the constitutionality of these provisions has not yet been considered by 
federal courts or evaluated by scholars.  
This Article describes this “intent revolution” against the backdrop 
of the ACA and other white collar crime statutes and offers some 
thoughts on why, and how, the ACA should be curbed, particularly in 
the context of white collar offenses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010,1 as amended by the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 20102 (collectively, ACA), has altered the 
landscape of health care and health insurance. However, it has also 
served to highlight the revolution occurring with respect to the intent 
requirement for white collar crimes. In particular, the ACA lowers the 
intent requirement for several health care fraud statutes from “specific 
intent to defraud” to “general intent to deceive,” which is consistent 
with federal courts’ recent trend of not requiring proof of a defendant’s 
knowledge of the law before finding a violation of a particular statute 
proscribing a so-called “white collar crime.” In contrast to some of the 
ACA’s other substantive provisions, the constitutionality of these 
provisions has not yet been considered by federal courts or evaluated by 
scholars. 
This Article describes this “intent revolution” against the backdrop 
of the ACA and other white collar crime statutes and offers some 
thoughts on why, and how, the ACA should be curbed, particularly in 
the context of white collar offenses. First, the Article provides a 
background understanding of white collar crime statutes, focusing 
specifically on the mens rea requirement component. Second, it takes an 
in-depth look at health care fraud and describes typical health care fraud 
remedies. Third, the Article outlines the relevant portions of the ACA, 
touching briefly on very recent challenges to other aspects of the ACA, 
such as the individual mandate requirement. Finally, the Article 
analyzes the dangers of a lowered intent requirement broadly and, more 
specifically, in the context of the ACA. It also provides a suggestion 
regarding how these dangers should be addressed with respect to the 
ACA’s problematic provisions. 
I.  WHITE COLLAR CRIME STATUTES AND THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT 
According to one scholar, a white collar crime should be defined by 
reference to what it is not: a crime that “(a) necessarily involve[s] force 
against a person or property; (b) directly relate[s] to the possession, sale, 
or distribution of narcotics; (c) directly relate[s] to organized crime 
activities; (d) directly relate[s] to such national policies as immigration, 
civil rights, and national security; or (e) directly involve[s] ‘vice crimes’ 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
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or the common theft of property.”3 Several of the most common white 
collar crimes fitting this definition, in addition to health care fraud and 
related crimes, are blackmail, bribery, embezzlement, extortion, insider 
trading, the prohibition on kickbacks, mail fraud, money laundering, 
racketeering, securities fraud, and wire fraud.4 
One of the most important aspects of a criminal offense statute is the 
mens rea provision, otherwise known as the “guilty mind” element, 
which is included in such statutes because “[t]he criminal law has 
traditionally required not only that the defendant cause a serious harm 
(the actus reus) but also that she do so with a particular state of mind—
criminal intent, purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or the like.”5 
If an individual commits an act that would otherwise constitute a crime, 
but lacks the requisite state of mind, she typically will not be considered 
deserving of punishment.6 
American criminal law has always focused on the issue of mens 
rea.7 For example, the Model Penal Code creates a presumption that a 
mens rea component applies to every material element in a crime, 
unless a statute clearly indicates otherwise.8 Further, as early as the 
1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Morissette v. United States,9 noted 
the importance of the mens rea requirement by stating: 
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only 
when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient 
notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of 
law as belief in freedom of the human will and a 
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to 
choose between good and evil. A relation between some 
mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost 
as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory “But I 
didn’t mean to[]” . . . .10 
                                                                                                                     
 3. J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2 (2002). 
 4. See id. at 2. 
 5. Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 512 (2004). 
 6. See id. (“People who cause harm without such mental element ordinarily cannot be 
said to be ‘at fault.’”). 
 7. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3 (1994) (“The mens rea presumption 
requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict 
with the related presumption, ‘deeply rooted in the American legal system,’ that, ordinarily, 
‘ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution.’” (quoting 
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991))). 
 8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1962). 
 9. 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
 10. Id. at 250–51. 
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Subsequently, in Liparota v. United States,11 the Court reaffirmed 
its holding in Morissette.12 It noted, however, that an exception existed 
in those cases where the statute “rendered criminal a type of conduct 
that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public 
regulation and may seriously threaten the community’s health or 
safety.”13 
However, in many white collar crime statutes, the mens rea 
requirement is either low or nonexistent (as in the case of strict liability 
offenses), and therefore, it is questionable whether persons accused of 
these crimes are required to be “morally culpable, or at least culpable to 
the extent that would justify the imposition of criminal penalties.”14 
Moreover, courts are divided regarding the appropriate mens rea 
requirement for several white collar crime statutes. For example, the 
mail and wire fraud statutes are silent regarding the requisite mens rea 
and federal courts disagree regarding the necessary level of intent. Some 
courts require a general intent to deceive, while others require a specific 
intent to defraud.15 Additionally, other statutes use terms such as 
                                                                                                                     
 11. 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
 12. Id. at 425–26.  
 13. Id. at 433. Courts of appeals have “read the Liparota exception as limited to cases in 
which the risks created by the defendants’ conduct ‘may be presumed to be regulated because of 
their inherent danger.’” John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections 
on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 211 (1991) 
(quoting United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
 14. Green, supra note 5, at 512; see also Martin Harrell et al., Federal Environmental 
Crime: A Different Kind of “White Collar” Prosecution, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 
2009, at 3. The Harrell article highlights the lowered mens rea requirement contained in many 
environmental crime statutes: 
One key way that environmental and other white collar cases differ is in the 
matter of proof. While environmental defendants are generally held to a 
“general intent” standard of conduct because of the nature of the regulatory 
program, cases in other white collar areas, such as fraud, require the 
government to establish that the defendant specifically intended to cheat 
individuals or organizations. Environmental cases sometimes involve people 
who set up “sham” businesses, and, in this regard, they are similar to some 
fraud prosecutions. 
Id. at 28; cf. Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate 
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 314 (2009) (explaining that it is difficult to prosecute white 
collar crimes because, among other reasons, “skilled defense counsel will be effective, at least 
on the margins, at making the unreasonable seem reasonable, which is particularly helpful for 
defendants trying to establish reasonable doubt about the ambiguous areas of moral wrongdoing 
sometimes associated with white-collar misconduct”). 
 15. See United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1302 (11th Cir. 2009) (“First, and most 
importantly, the specific intent required under the mail and wire fraud statutes is the intent to 
defraud, not the intent to violate a particular statute or regulation.” (citing United States v. 
Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1285 (11th Cir. 1996))); United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 518–19 
(5th Cir. 2006) (holding that mail and wire fraud require a “specific intent to defraud, i.e., a 
4
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“knowingly and willfully,”16 and courts disagree regarding the meaning 
of these terms.17 The bribery statute requires that the offense be 
committed “corruptly.”18 Other statutes, such as the civil Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), require a plaintiff to 
demonstrate whatever mens rea is required in the provisions prohibiting 
the underlying “racketeering activity.”19 
A relatively recent trend in the criminal law is the movement away 
from specific intent to general intent crimes, particularly with respect to 
white collar crimes.20 As one scholar points out, “The courts have 
become increasingly receptive to allowing an inference of criminal 
mens rea from reckless behavior by defendants.”21 This change is 
evidenced by the decrease in use of specific intent, or “willfulness,” jury 
instructions and the increase in use of instructions that facilitate the 
inference of criminal mens rea from recklessness.22 
                                                                                                                     
‘conscious knowing intent to defraud’” (quoting United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 736 (5th 
Cir. 2001))); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Introduction: Tax Evasion as White Collar Fraud, 9 HOUS. 
BUS. & TAX L.J. 207, 219 (2009) (comparing the mens rea of general fraud statutes to that 
involved in criminal tax provisions). Note, however, that in Paradies, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit stated that “[i]n mail fraud cases, the government need only prove that 
the defendant had the intent to deceive.” Paradies, 98 F.3d at 1285. 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). 
 17. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–93 (1998) (holding that “in order to 
establish a ‘willful’ violation of a statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted 
with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful’” and that “unless the text of the statute dictates a 
different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that 
constitute the offense” (footnote omitted) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 
(1994))); Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable 
Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 396 (1998) (explaining that courts’ decisions regarding the 
meaning of the term “willfully” “created a body of haphazard constructions”); Andrea Tuwiner 
Vavonese, Comment, The Medicare Anti-Kickback Provision of the Social Security Act—Is 
Ignorance of the Law an Excuse for Fraudulent and Abusive Use of the System?, 45 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 943, 947 (1996) (stating that “[t]he definition[s] of the term[s] knowingly and willfully 
ha[ve] been unclear in many areas of criminal law,” and that “[t]he issue is whether the 
prosecutor must prove that the defendant consciously and intentionally committed the act or 
whether the defendant knew the act was in violation of the law”) (citations omitted). 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).  
 19. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–62; Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes by Health Care Providers, 1996 
U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 649. 
 20. See Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate Executives Who Have Been 
Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279, 297–99 (1991) (“The 
courts’ increased willingness to allow inferences of criminal mens rea from recklessness can be 
seen by examining the evolution of the following four jury instructions that define various issues 
of intent: (1) specific intent, (2) willfulness, (3) guilty knowledge, and (4) false and fraudulent.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 21. Id. at 296–97. 
 22. See id. at 303 (explaining that changes in four particular “criminal intent instructions 
reflect a trend toward diluting the government’s burden of proving criminal intent”: (1) “[t]he 
‘specific intent’ instruction, with its emphasis on ‘purposely intending to violate the law,’ is 
being phased out”; (2) “[t]he ‘willfulness’ instruction’s reference to ‘specific intent to do 
5
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II.  HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
Before World War I, patients paid health care providers directly for 
their services.23 The providers, in turn, “charged for medical care on a 
per-service basis, such as the amount of time spent with the patient or 
the type of procedure performed.”24 This practice continued until the 
Great Depression.25 Health insurance was developed as a “response to 
problems faced during the Depression by physicians and hospitals with 
an increasingly cash-strapped patient base.”26 At its inception, health 
insurance reimbursed patients for a predetermined portion of their 
bills.27 Eventually, insurance began to look much like it does today with 
physicians receiving payments directly from the insurer and the insurer 
                                                                                                                     
something the law forbids’ appears to be fading and is being replaced with a diluted version of 
‘willfully’ that equates willfulness with ‘reckless disregard of the law’”; (3) “at least in the 
white collar criminal cases, there is increasing use of the ‘guilty knowledge’ instruction which 
allows a jury to infer knowledge of facts from evidence that the defendant deliberately closed 
his eyes to what was obvious,” and “[t]o the extent that deliberately closing one’s eyes to the 
obvious is behaving ‘recklessly,’ this instruction arguably allows an inference of criminal mens 
rea from recklessness”; and (4) “[t]he definition of ‘false or fraudulent representation’ further 
facilitates inferences of criminal mens rea from recklessness by defining a false or fraudulent 
representation as one made with reckless disregard for truth or falsity”); see also Pamela H. 
Bucy, The Poor Fit of Traditional Evidentiary Doctrine and Sophisticated Crime: An Empirical 
Analysis of Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, 476 n.562 (1994) 
(observing that “there is a growing trend in white collar criminal cases, not seen with traditional 
street crimes, to dilute the mens rea requirement” with “the increasing prosecution of regulatory 
offenses where strict or absolute liability suffices for criminal liability, in the willingness of 
courts to define ‘intentionally’ as ‘reckless disregard,’ and in the prosecution of corporations, 
where current standards of criminal liability contain no mens rea requirement”). 
 23. See A. Craig Eddy, The Effect of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on Health Care Fraud in Montana, 62 MONT. L. REV. 175, 179 (2000). 
 24. Joan H. Krause, The Brief Life of the Gag Clause: Why Anti-Gag Clause Legislation 
Isn’t Enough, 67 TENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id.; see also Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect 
Would Be on American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339, 1358 (1994) 
(“[D]octors [around this time] would have considered the fact that their patients would pay for 
[expensive diagnostic tests or treatments]. When doctors did recommend a test or procedure, 
patients might decline on grounds that it would cost too much.”). 
 27. See Krause, supra note 24, at 6; see also Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health 
Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708 (1986). The article details how health insurance originally operated: 
Because of the profession’s resistance to direct relationships between insurance 
companies and physicians, most payment plans developed in the indemnity 
format. Under this format, physicians bill[ed] patients directly for services 
provided and the patients [were] subsequently reimbursed by their insurance 
carrier, sometimes for the full amount they paid or for only a lesser “allowed” 
amount. 
Id. at 712. 
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being reimbursed in accordance with a specific, predetermined fee 
arrangement.28 The first such insurance plans were the Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield plans, pursuant to which “all members of a group paid the same 
amount for hospitalization or medical benefits without regard for their 
individual medical conditions or likely medical expenses.”29 However, 
these and other early health insurance plans had the effect of leaving 
elderly, unemployed, self-employed, and low-income individuals 
without insurance.30 
In its nascent stage, health insurance “offer[ed] some opportunity 
for fraud through charging for services not provided.”31 This type of 
fraud, however, was generally relegated to state courts, as it concerned a 
civil matter litigated between the private third party insurers and the 
medical care providers.32 Health care fraud became a matter of federal 
concern in 1965, when Medicare and Medicaid were signed into law.33 
Both of these programs were based on the Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
model.34 “Under Medicare and Medicaid, hospitals were paid for each 
service rendered according to the ‘reasonable’ cost of service rather than 
to a schedule of negotiated rates. Physicians’ fees were based upon 
‘customary’ charges for each service rendered.”35 Through Medicare 
and Medicaid, the federal government became a major insurer and 
earned the right to be a direct plaintiff in civil health care fraud cases.36 
The fee-for-service premise of Medicare and Medicaid led to an 
increase in health care fraud because these programs did not have any 
                                                                                                                     
 28. Krause, supra note 24, at 6–7; see also Capron, supra note 27 (“Over time, however, 
many insurance programs adopted the service approach to insurance, in which enrollees’ 
premiums guarantee[d] them certain services such as a specified number of days of hospital 
care, and those providing the services agree[d] to accept the program’s allowed payment as full 
compensation.”); Eddy, supra note 23 (“[A]s America industrialized and populations 
concentrated, the concept of health insurance developed both as a way to share the cost of injury 
and as a way to attract physicians to the expanding, but somewhat undesirable, West by 
guaranteeing them a livable income.”). 
 29. Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74 B.U. L. 
REV. 109, 111 n.8 (1994). 
 30. See Pamela H, Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Providers, 67 
N.C. L. REV. 855, 864 (1989). 
 31. See Eddy, supra note 23. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290 
(1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 426–426a, 1395–1396d (2006)); Medicaid Act, 
Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396g, 1396i–
1396v (2006)). 
 34. See Eddy, supra note 23 (“Medicare was constructed following the Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield model with fee for service reimbursement by a third party payer mechanism. Part A of 
Medicare mimicked Blue Cross paying for hospitalization and Part B emulated Blue Shield 
paying for physician services.”).  
 35. Bucy, supra note 30 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(b)(1) (1982)). 
 36. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 180. 
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measures in place to guard against fraud.37 Specifically, the fact that the 
more services physicians provide, the more they get paid by the 
government, encourages four types of fraud: “1) billing for services not 
provided; 2) billing for a service more expensive than that actually 
provided; 3) billing for unnecessary services; 4) paying kickbacks for 
referrals.”38 
Health care fraud prosecutions may be pursued “administratively, 
civilly, or criminally.”39 Administrative causes of action are controlled 
by the rules promulgated by the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) and state Medicaid boards; however, these rules change 
frequently.40 Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,41 “[t]hese 
actions are subject to administrative due process” and “are used 
primarily to bring individual providers into compliance” with the 
appropriate regulations.42 Examples of administrative claims include 
“actions brought by the United States Postal Service to enjoin 
fraudulent schemes being conducted through the U.S. mail”;43 actions 
filed by HHS under the Civil Monetary Penalties Law for “damages 
caused by a provider’s fraud or to recollect payments already made to a 
provider and later determined to be fraudulent”;44 actions brought by 
HHS and the states to terminate providers from participation in 
Medicare and Medicaid due to fraud or other improper actions;45 and 
actions by State Boards of Registration “to revoke a provider’s 
professional license because of fraud by the provider.”46 
Civil actions addressing health care fraud are typically brought if 
administrative actions were ineffective in deterring fraudulent conduct 
or if a provider’s actions are particularly outrageous.47 There are many 
civil remedies for health care fraud, and private individuals, insurance 
companies, or government entities can bring actions seeking such 
remedies.48 For example, private individuals can file malpractice 
                                                                                                                     
 37. See id. 
 38. Id.; see also PETER J. HENNING & LEE J. RADEK, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF 
PUBLIC CORRUPTION 161 (2011) (defining the term “kickback” and stating that “[w]hile the 
bribe must ‘induce or influence’ the defendant’s action, the kickback need only interfere with 
the person’s exercise of authority, so that the government would not have to prove a quid pro 
quo agreement that links the benefit to a particular government action”). 
 39. Eddy, supra note 23, at 181–82. 
 40. See id. at 182.  
 41. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2006). 
 42. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 182. 
 43. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 873 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1982)). 
 44. Id. at 873–74 (footnote omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2006). 
 45. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 874; see also 42 C.F.R. § 1004.120 (2006). 
 46. Bucy, supra note 30, at 874. 
 47. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 183. 
 48. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 874. 
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lawsuits based on fraud against their health care providers49 or they can 
bring qui tam actions pursuant to the civil False Claims Act (FCA) to 
recover damages caused by provider fraud.50 Insurance companies can 
also bring tort and breach of contract suits against providers.51 Further, 
Medicare fiscal intermediaries can suspend payments to providers in 
order to recover previously paid amounts that were subsequently 
determined to be fraudulent.52 The federal government can file civil 
lawsuits under the FCA to recover damages caused by provider fraud,53 
while state governments, like individuals, can pursue qui tam actions 
under the FCA to achieve the same result.54 Federal and state 
governments can also prosecute health care fraud civilly by using the 
civil RICO and money laundering statutes to obtain asset forfeiture.55 
The decision to pursue health care fraud criminally, rather than 
utilizing administrative or civil remedies, is usually based on a 
determination of whether the evidence is likely to establish guilt by only 
a “preponderance of the evidence” or by the higher “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard of proof. The degree of intent and the 
amount of damages involved are also considered.56 Federal criminal 
prosecutions of health care fraud tend not to proceed under statutes 
specifically covering Medicare and Medicaid fraud.57 Rather, these 
prosecutions typically utilize the specific statute prohibiting health care 
fraud58 or general statutes proscribing mail fraud, wire fraud, or 
                                                                                                                     
 49. Id. 
 50. Id.; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2006). 
 51. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 873. 
 52. See id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 405.371 (2006). 
 53. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 873; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). 
 54. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 874; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). States can also 
bring civil actions in their own capacity to recover damages due to health care provider fraud. 
 55. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 183–84; see also Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006) (discussing money 
laundering). 
 56. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 184. 
 57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006) (characterizing health care fraud in terms of false 
statements and representations).  
 58. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006); see also Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, 
Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 973 
(noting that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) contains a 
number of amendments to Medicare and Medicaid laws and makes health care fraud a federal 
crime). The health care fraud statute reads as follows: 
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a 
scheme or artifice-- 
(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or 
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or 
control of, any health care benefit program, in connection with the delivery of 
9
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conspiracy.59 Such prosecutions can also be based on the criminal 
FCA,60 the False Statements Act (FSA),61 or the Social Security Act 
                                                                                                                     
or payment for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. If the violation results 
in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), such person 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; 
and if the violation results in death, such person shall be fined under this title, 
or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both. 
(b) With respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual 
knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this 
section. 
18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006); Benson Weintraub, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 Reduces the Criminal Mens Rea Requirement for Healthcare Fraud and Increases 
Penalties Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (Sept. 6, 
2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2010/09/the-patient-protection-
and-affordable-care-act-of-2010-reduces-the-criminal-mens-rea-requirement-for.html (citing 
United States v. Abdallah, 629 F. Supp. 2d 699, 720 (S.D. Tex. 2009)); see also United States v. 
Choiniere, 517 F.3d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 2008). Where the defendant was defrauding Medicare, 
Medicaid, and private insurance companies, the court employed the language of the health care 
fraud statute in the jury instructions: 
Another instruction informed the jury that to convict Choiniere, the government 
needed to prove both that there was a scheme to defraud and that Choiniere 
participated in the scheme knowingly and with intent to defraud. The 
instruction further defined “intent to defraud” to mean “that the acts charged 
were done knowingly with the intent to deceive or cheat the victims in order to 
cause a gain of money or property to the defendant.” 
Id. 
 59. See Bucy, supra note 19, at 591–92; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (discussing 
mail fraud); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) (“Fraud by wire, radio, or television.”); Bria N. 
DeSalvo, Katherine M. Keith & Annette Soberats, Health Care Fraud, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
681, 722–23 (2010) (collecting statutes). 
 60. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). The statute states: 
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or 
naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any 
claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof, 
knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned 
not more than five years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in 
this title. 
Id. 
 61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). The statute states: 
[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or 
judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and 
willfully— (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device 
a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document 
knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or entry; shall be . . . imprisoned not more than [five] years [or fined 
10
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(SSA).62 State criminal prosecutions of health care fraud typically 
reference statutes pertaining not only to Medicaid and Medicare fraud, 
but also to controlled substance offenses, larceny, and conspiracy.63 
However, as this Article focuses primarily on federal law, a detailed 
analysis of state criminal prosecutions of health care fraud is outside of 
its scope. 
In addition to the statutes mentioned above, the following provisions 
can be used to criminally prosecute health care fraud in the federal 
context: (1) statutes criminalizing kickbacks (or “payments by one 
provider to another for referrals of patients or medical business”64) and 
self-referrals,65 “which occur when a provider refers patients to clinics 
or companies in which the provider has a financial interest”;66 (2) 
statutes criminalizing money laundering—specifically those that 
criminalize the movement of illegally obtained money or the movement 
of legally obtained money to avoid tax or reporting obligations;67 (3) 
criminal RICO;68 (4) the general conspiracy statute69 and the specific 
statute prohibiting conspiracies to submit false claims to the 
government;70 and (5) the statute criminalizing theft of government 
property.71 
With many of these statutes, the issue of whether or not the conduct 
in question is criminal depends on the intent of the provider.72 
Moreover, there is not a uniform intent standard pertaining to all 
statutes dealing with health care fraud.73 For example, to establish a 
                                                                                                                     
in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3751], or both. 
Id. 
 62. DeSalvo et al., supra note 59, at 722; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7b(a) (2006) 
(imposing criminal penalties for acts involving federal health care programs). 
 63. Bucy, supra note 19, at 592. 
 64. Id. at 609. 
 65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006). 
 66. Bucy, supra note 19, at 609. 
 67. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957. 
 68. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968. 
 69. See 18 U.S.C. § 371. 
 70. See 18 U.S.C. § 286. 
 71. See 18 U.S.C. § 641. The statute states: 
Whoever embezzles, steals, [or] purloins . . . any record, voucher, money, or 
thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency 
thereof . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten 
years, or both; but if the value of such property . . . does not exceed the sum of 
$1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, 
or both. 
Id. 
 72. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 186.  
 73. See id. (“The definition of intent varies with the statute invoked to charge health care 
11
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violation of the criminal FCA, the government must show that: “(1) the 
defendant presented a false or fraudulent claim against the United 
States; (2) the claim was presented to an agency or contractor of the 
United States; and (3) the defendant knew the claim was false or 
fraudulent.”74 The Supreme Court has held that “‘purpose’ corresponds 
loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while 
‘knowledge’ corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent.”75 
However, the courts of appeals are divided regarding the requisite 
scienter for the criminal FCA.76 Some courts hold “that deliberate 
ignorance can establish knowledge of falsity,”77 while others require the 
satisfaction of the following, more rigorous standard: “To be false, a 
claim must not only be inaccurate but consciously so.”78 
Similarly, to establish a violation of the FSA, the government must 
prove that the defendant “(1) ‘knowingly and willfully’ (2) ‘[made] any 
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation’ (3) 
in a ‘matter within the jurisdiction of the executive . . . branch of the 
Government of the United States.’”79 This statute’s “willfulness” 
requirement would seem to require the government to prove that the 
defendant knew that making the false statement would be a crime.80 
However, it appears that at least some appellate courts maintain that 
FSA cases do not require proof of a defendant’s knowledge of the law.81 
 
                                                                                                                     
fraud.”). 
 74. United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 142 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); see 
also 18 U.S.C. § 287. 
 75. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980) (citations omitted); see also Pierre 
v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 76. See United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d 577, 595 n.9 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 77. Id. at 595. 
 78. United States v. Barker, 967 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 79. United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001(a)(2)). 
 80. See id. at 703–04 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also Bryan v. United States, 524 
U.S. 184, 191–92 (1998) (“As a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a ‘willful’ 
act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ In other words, in order to establish a ‘willful’ 
violation of a statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that 
his conduct was unlawful.’” (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994))). 
 81. See, e.g., United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The footnote 
acknowledges that the “willfully” requirement of § 2(b) must be proved for a criminal 
conviction, as the “knowingly” requirement is then inevitably proven: 
Although the district judge appeared to attribute this knowledge-of-criminality 
requirement to § 1001’s “knowingly and willfully” language, it must, if it exists 
at all, be a gloss of “willfully” in § 2(b): no court adopting such a requirement 
has questioned the rule that knowledge of criminality need not be shown in 
direct § 1001 prosecutions. 
Id. 
12
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The “knowingly and willfully” standard is also utilized in the so-
called anti-kickback statute, pursuant to which “it is illegal for a person 
to ‘knowingly and willfully solicit[] or receive[] any remuneration’ for 
referrals for services covered by the federal government.”82 As was true 
of the previously mentioned statutes, prior to the passage of the ACA in 
early 2010, federal courts disagreed regarding the level of intent 
necessitated by the use of the term “willfully,” as it is used in the anti-
kickback statute.83 The same standard is employed in the health care 
fraud statute. To support a conviction under this statute,  
the government must prove that the defendant: 
(1) knowingly and willfully executed, or attempted to 
execute, a scheme or artifice; to (2) defraud a health care 
benefit program or to obtain by false or fraudulent 
pretenses any money or property under the custody or 
control of a health care benefit program; (3) in connection 
with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, 
items, or services.84  
Before the passage of the ACA, unlike all of the above-mentioned 
statutes, the courts of appeals seemed to agree that this statute required 
proof of specific intent.85 
                                                                                                                     
 82. United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 837 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-7b(b)).  
 83. See United States v. Mittal, 36 F. App’x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2002). The court held as 
follows: 
We have not yet decided whether, in a prosecution for a violation of the 
Medicare anti-kickback statute, the Government is required to prove that the 
defendant knew of and intended to violate that specific statute. We recognize 
the lack of unanimity among the other Circuits that have addressed this 
particular question.  
Id. at 21 (citations omitted). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Ratzlaf in a 
health care fraud case, holding that the element of intent required the defendants to know that 
their conduct was unlawful and to undertake that conduct with specific intent to commit the 
crime. Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995). Subsequently, a 
district court in the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, concluding that Ratzlaf was 
distinguishable because it concerned another statute whose language was arguably more 
ambiguous than that of the anti-kickback statute. United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 
494–97 (S.D. Ohio 1995); see also United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440–41 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(distinguishing the use of the term ‘willfully’ in Ratzlaf with its use in the Medicare anti-
kickback statute). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, adopting an intermediate 
position, has required that the prosecutor prove that there is no reasonable interpretation of the 
rules which could render a defendant’s statements truthful. United States v. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d 
1517, 1524 (10th Cir. 1994). Thus far, the Supreme Court has not addressed the meaning of the 
term “willfully” in the Medicare fraud context. 
 84. United States v. Abdallah, 629 F. Supp. 2d 699, 720 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 393–94 (6th Cir. 2007); United States 
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Federal criminal prosecutions of health care fraud are also affected 
by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,86 which created the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission that, in turn, promulgated the federal 
sentencing guidelines.87 Although the guidelines are now advisory,88 
federal courts still generally adhere to the guidelines’ recommendations 
at sentencing.89 Thus, individuals convicted of health care fraud can 
face steep sentences in accordance with the guidelines because health 
care offenses “often stem from an improper billing procedure that has 
been repeated for multiple patients,” and therefore, providers can be 
charged with multiple counts of the same offense.90 
III.  THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
The ACA91 is “the most sweeping health care legislation since the 
implementation of Medicare.”92 It was designed to provide affordable 
health insurance coverage to a larger number of individuals than were 
covered by Medicare.93 In an attempt to make health insurance 
affordable and available, the ACA permits “individuals and small 
businesses to leverage their collective buying power to obtain prices 
competitive with group plans.”94 It also “provides for incentives for 
expanded group plans through employers, affords tax credits for low-
income individuals and families, extends Medicaid, and increases 
federal subsidies to state-run programs.”95 Significantly, the ACA 
“prohibits insurance companies from denying coverage to those with 
pre-existing medical conditions, setting eligibility rules based on 
                                                                                                                     
v. Hickman, 331 F.3d 439, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 86. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
18 U.S.C.). 
 87. See Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 752 n.63 
(2010). 
 88. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005). 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Curb, 626 F.3d 921, 927–28 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A district 
judge’s reasoned agreement with an advisory sentencing guideline will not be deemed 
unreasonable on appeal.”); United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that within-the-guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable and that ‘“when the 
district court adheres to the advisory [g]uidelines range,’ § 3553(c)(1) ‘does not impose upon 
district courts a duty to engage in . . . particularized analysis”’ (quoting United States v. A.B., 
529 F.3d 1275, 1289 (10th Cir. 2008))). 
 90. Eddy, supra note 23, at 185. 
 91. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 92. Health Law Update, KROGER BURRUS, http://www.krogerlaw.com/HealthLawUpdate.html 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
 93. See id. 
 94. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (E.D. Mich. 2010) 
(citations omitted). 
 95. Id. (citations omitted). 
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medical factors or claims experience, or rescinding coverage for reasons 
other than fraud or misrepresentation.”96 
Arguably the most well-known provision of the ACA is the so-
called individual mandate requirement, pursuant to which all U.S. 
citizens, with some minor exceptions, must “maintain ‘minimum 
essential [health care] coverage’ every month beginning in 2014 in an 
effort to ‘lower the cost of health insurance, expand coverage, and 
reduce uncompensated care.’”97 A citizen who does not comply with 
this requirement must pay a penalty enclosed with her tax return.98 
Not only has this provision been discussed at length by scholars and 
commentators,99 but it has also been challenged numerous times at the 
district court level.100 Further, several circuit courts have considered 
appeals on the issue.101 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits were the first to issue opinions concerning the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate requirement. In the Sixth 
Circuit case, Thomas More Law Center v. Obama,102 the plaintiffs—a 
public interest law firm and four individuals—sought a determination 
that “Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to pass the 
minimum coverage provision, and alternatively a declaration that the 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. (citations omitted). 
 97. Id. (citations omitted). The court identified the congressional intent of implementing 
the individual mandate: 
Congress found that without the Individual Mandate, the reforms in the Act, 
such as the ban on denying coverage based on pre-existing conditions, would 
increase the existing incentives for individuals to “wait to purchase health 
insurance until they needed care,” which in turn would shift even greater costs 
onto third parties. Conversely, Congress found that by “significantly reducing 
the number of the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other 
provisions of this Act, will lower health insurance premiums.” 
Id. at 886–87 (citations omitted). 
 98. Id. at 890 (citations omitted). 
 99. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health 
Insurance, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 482, 482–83 (2010) (discussing the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-
Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 114–18 (2010) (same). 
 100. See Kevin Sack, Judge Voids Key Element of Obama Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 2010, at A1 (stating that, as of December 2010, there were approximately two dozen 
lawsuits challenging the health care law at the district court level). 
 101. See Kevin Sack, Judges Weigh Limits of Health Law’s Powers, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 
2011, at A17 (stating that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits had heard 
oral arguments in cases challenging the individual mandate); Lyle Denniston, U.S. Resists Fast 
Track on Health Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2011, 9:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com 
/2011/03/u-s-resists-fast-track-on-health-case/ (“The Fourth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Eleventh 
Circuit and, as of Thursday, the D.C. Circuit have all put health care appeals on abbreviated 
briefing and argument schedules, before three-judge panels.”). 
 102. No. 10-2388, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011).  
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penalty is an unconstitutional tax.”103 Judge Boyce F. Martin, joined by 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton, determined that the plaintiffs had standing to 
pursue the suit and that the court had jurisdiction over the action in 
accordance with the Anti-Injunction Act.104 Then, Judge Sutton, joined 
by Judge James L. Graham, sitting by designation from the Southern 
District of Ohio, concluded that the penalty was not a tax “under Article 
I of the Constitution,105 and Congress’s taxing power thus [could not] 
sustain it.”106 Finally, Judge Sutton joined in Judge Martin’s holding 
that “the minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause.”107 
In the Eleventh Circuit case, Florida v. United States Department of 
Health & Human Services,108 the plaintiffs—twenty-six states, two 
private individuals, and the National Federation of Independent 
Business109—also challenged the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate and the Medicaid expansion.110 Judge Frank M. Hull and Chief 
Judge Joel F. Dubina determined, as an initial matter, that plaintiffs had 
standing to challenge this provision,111 and then upheld the district 
court’s determination that the Medicaid expansion was not 
unconstitutional.112 They held that the individual mandate “exceeds 
Congress’s commerce power”113 because “[t]he federal government’s 
assertion of power, under the Commerce Clause, to issue an economic 
mandate for Americans to purchase insurance from a private company 
for the entire duration of their lives is unprecedented, lacks cognizable 
limits, and imperils our federalist structure.”114 Judges Hull and Dubina 
also found that the individual mandate could not be supported by 
Congress’s tax power, but held that it was severable from the other 
provisions of the ACA.115 Judge Stanley Marcus concurred in part and 
dissented in part. He would have upheld the individual mandate as 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Thomas More Law Ctr., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *3–4. 
 104. Id. at *18. The Anti-Injunction Act bars “suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006). 
 105. Article I of the Constitution vests certain enumerated rights in Congress. See Paul M. 
Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and 
Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2331 (2003). 
 106. Thomas More Law Ctr., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *64. 
 107. Id. at *48, *52. 
 108. 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 109. Id. at 1240. 
 110. Id. at 1241. The ACA “expands Medicaid eligibility and subsidies by amending 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a, the section of the Medicaid Act outlining what states must offer in their 
coverage plans.” Id. at 1261.  
 111. Id. at 1244. 
 112. Id. at 1262. 
 113. Id. at 1282. 
 114. Id. at 1312–13. 
 115. Id. at 1241. 
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constitutional because it falls within Congress’s commerce power.116 
Subsequent to these decisions, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Fourth and D.C. Circuits also issued opinions regarding the 
constitutionality of the ACA. The Fourth Circuit declined to rule based 
on the Anti-Injuction Act,117 and the D.C. Circuit upheld the ACA’s 
individual mandate provision.118 The Supreme Court has agreed to hear 
the appeal from the Eleventh Circuit and is slated “to decide not only 
whether the mandate is constitutional but also, if it is not, how much of 
the balance of the . . . [ACA] must fall along with it.”119 
Aside from providing a brief background, this Article does not focus 
on the provisions of the ACA that specifically relate to health care 
coverage. Rather, it examines the parts of the ACA that have an effect 
on existing statutes, such as the anti-kickback statute and the health care 
fraud statute. 
First, the ACA revises the intent requirement of the anti-kickback 
statute by inserting into the statute a subsection (h), which states: “With 
respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual 
knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this 
section.”120 Commentators have suggested that “[t]his new standard will 
impact transactions and arrangements counseling and could potentially 
create significant criminal and civil fraud exposure for transactions and 
arrangements where there is no intent to violate the statute.”121 The 
ACA also provides that a violation of the anti-kickback statute 
constitutes a violation of the civil FCA.122 Although the ACA 
specifically references the civil FCA, zealous prosecutors could attempt 
to apply it in the criminal FCA context. Second, the ACA clarifies the 
health care fraud statute’s intent requirement by adding to the statute a 
subsection (b), which states: “With respect to violations of this section, 
                                                                                                                     
 116. Id. at 1365 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 117. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 
8, 2011). 
 118. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2011).   
 119. Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Health Care Case as Race Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 15, 2011, at A1.  
 120. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f), 124 Stat. 119, 759 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-7b(h)).  
 121. Kathleen McDermott et al., New Healthcare Fraud and Abuse and Program Integrity 
Provisions: Let’s Fasten Our Seat Belts for the Bumpy Ride, AHLA CONNECTIONS, May 2010, 
at 13, available at www.healthlawyers.org/News/Connections/CurrentIssue/Documents/2010%2 
0Features/Feature_May10.pdf. 
 122. Alan J. Sobol, Staying on Top of the Issues: New Developments for White Collar 
Lawyers and their Clients, ASPATORE, 2010 WL 5312568, at *1 (Dec. 2010); see also Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 6402(f), 124 Stat. 119, 759 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g)) 
(“In addition to the penalties provided for in this section or section 1128A, a claim that includes 
items or services resulting from a violation of this section constitutes a false or fraudulent claim 
for purposes of subchapter III of chapter 37 of title 31, United States Code.”). 
17
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a person need not have actual knowledge of this section or specific 
intent to commit a violation of this section.”123 Additionally, the ACA 
provides that a violation of the health care fraud statute constitutes a 
false claim in violation of the civil FCA124 and amends the definition of 
“federal crime of health care fraud” to include violations of the anti-
kickback statute, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).125 Relatedly, the 
ACA amends the federal sentencing guidelines, as they relate to 
individuals convicted of offenses related to any federal health care 
program.126 Pursuant to this amendment, the offense level for these 
individuals will increase between 20% and 50% if the loss involves 
more than a million dollars.127 According to some commentators, “In a 
highly regulated industry, with a myriad of complex regulations, these 
provisions effectively increase exposure for a broad array of business 
and regulatory activities where there is no specific intent to violate the 
provisions of the statute.”128 
IV.  THE DANGERS OF A LOWERED INTENT REQUIREMENT IN THE WHITE 
COLLAR AND HEALTH CARE CONTEXTS 
All of the challenges to the ACA thus far have focused on the 
individual mandate provision. As a result, no court has evaluated the 
effect of the ACA’s lowering of the intent requirement pertaining to a 
number of health care fraud statutes and the corresponding increase in 
the severity of the guidelines with respect to health care fraud offenses. 
A.  The Reduction or Elimination of the Mens Rea Requirement in 
White Collar Crime Statutes 
The ACA is only the latest statute evincing the trend of the 
diminution or elimination of the mens rea requirement in criminal 
statutes. With respect to the health care context, prior to the enactment 
of the ACA, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA)129 criminalized certain HIPAA violations that were committed 
through willful neglect, which was not defined by the statute.130 The 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10606(b), 124 Stat. 119, 1008 (2010); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1347 (2006) (proscribing health care fraud). 
 124. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1313(a)(6)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 185 (2010). 
 125. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10606(c), 124 Stat. 119, 1008 (2010). 
 126. McDermott et al., supra note 121, at 16. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
 130. Jon A. Sale et al., Emerging Trends in Criminal Healthcare Law Enforcement: The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Reduces the Criminal Mens Rea 
Requirement for Healthcare Fraud and Increases Penalties Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, HEALTH L., Feb. 2011, at 20. 
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Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH), which amended HIPAA and is part of ARRA,131 defined 
“willful neglect” as follows: “conscious, intentional failure or reckless 
indifference to the obligation to comply with the administrative 
simplification provision violated.”132 Thus, the relevant level of intent 
suggested by this term is something close to negligence, and it does not 
appear that an awareness of wrongdoing is required. 
Concerning white collar crime statutes in general, according to a 
study conducted in May 2010 by the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers and the Heritage Foundation, from 2005 through 
2006, members of Congress proposed 446 non-violent offenses with 
diminished mens rea requirements. Of these, thirty-six were enacted 
into law.133 The study also noted that in a “sharp break” with the prior 
tradition of requiring the government to prove that the defendant acted 
with a guilty mind, meaning that she knew that her conduct was 
unlawful or was at least on notice that she could possibly be subject to 
criminal liability, “the recent proliferation of federal criminal laws has 
produced scores of criminal offenses that lack adequate mens rea 
requirements and are vague in defining the conduct that they 
criminalize.”134 
To satisfy due process requirements, thereby also avoiding a finding 
of vagueness, a statute must “define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.”135 The Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized that “the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is 
closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of 
mens rea.”136 Thus, a specific intent requirement may allow a statute to 
avoid being invalidated on the grounds of vagueness while the same 
would not be true of a general intent provision.137 
                                                                                                                     
 131. See Nicolas P. Terry, Physicians and Patients Who “Friend” or “Tweet”: Constructing 
a Legal Framework for Social Networking in a Highly Regulated Domain, 43 IND. L. REV. 285, 
317 (2010). 
 132. 45 C.F.R. § 160.401 (2010). 
 133. BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS 
ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW, at X (2010), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/WhiteCollar/WithoutIntent/$FILE/WithoutIntentReport.pdf. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also Paul H. Robinson, Fair 
Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 356 (2005) 
(describing the void-for-vagueness doctrine). 
 136. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979). 
 137. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). The Court reinforced the notion that a 
specific intent requirement would serve to help prevent challenges to the application of a statute: 
[W]here the punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the 
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Recently, in Skilling v. United States,138 the Court considered the 
argument that another significant white collar crime statute, the honest-
services fraud statute,139 was unconstitutionally vague. Section 1346 of 
the statute states that “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term 
‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive 
another of the intangible right of honest services.”140 
With respect to the premise of the case, Jeffrey Skilling, the former 
chief executive officer of Enron, and other high-ranking Enron 
executives were alleged to have “engaged in a wide-ranging scheme to 
deceive the investing public, including Enron’s shareholders, . . . about 
the true performance of Enron’s businesses by: (a) manipulating 
Enron’s publicly reported financial results; and (b) making public 
statements and representations about Enron’s financial performance and 
results that were false and misleading.”141 Further, these individuals 
allegedly “enriched themselves as a result of the scheme through salary, 
bonuses, grants of stock and stock options, other profits, and 
prestige.”142 The first count of the indictment charged Skilling with 
conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud and specifically alleged 
that he had sought to ‘“depriv[e] Enron and its shareholders of the 
intangible right of [his] honest services.’”143 The indictment also 
charged Skilling with “more than 25 substantive counts of securities 
fraud, wire fraud, making false representations to Enron’s auditors, and 
insider trading.”144 
Following a four-month trial, a Houston jury found Skilling guilty 
of nineteen counts,145 including one count of conspiracy to commit 
honest-services wire fraud.146 On appeal before the Fifth Circuit, 
                                                                                                                     
purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to 
suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a 
violation of law. The requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful may 
not render certain, for all purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is 
in some respects uncertain. But it does relieve the statute of the objection that it 
punishes without warning an offense of which the accused was unaware. 
Id. at 102.  
 138. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010). 
 139. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). 
 140. Id.  
 141. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2908 (quoting the indictment) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 142. Id. (quoting the indictment) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 143. Id. (quoting the indictment). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Two Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1. 
 146. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2911. The honest-services wire-fraud charge was based on 18 
U.S.C. §§ 371, 1343, 1346 (2000). Section 371 states in part that if two or more persons 
conspire to defraud the United States or any agency thereof “and one or more of such persons do 
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss2/4
2012] TOWARD A SPECIFIC INTENT REQUIREMENT 469 
 
Skilling raised two questions: (1) whether “pretrial publicity and 
community prejudice prevented him from obtaining a fair trial”; and (2) 
whether “the jury improperly convicted him of conspiracy to commit 
honest-services wire fraud.”147 The Fifth Circuit answered no to both 
questions and affirmed Skilling’s conviction.148 Skilling then appealed 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted a writ of 
certiorari.149 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit regarding the 
failure of Skilling’s fair trial argument.150 However, it disagreed with 
the Fifth Circuit regarding that court’s rejection of Skilling’s honest-
services argument.151 The Court held that Congress had not spoken 
clearly enough with respect to § 1346.152 It stated that, according to its 
precedent, the honest-services statute should be narrowly construed, 
rather than invalidated.153 The Court then went on to limit the statute’s 
application by holding that it could apply only to “fraudulent schemes to 
deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks supplied 
by a third party who had not been deceived.”154 If § 1346 was construed 
to extend beyond schemes to defraud involving bribes and kickbacks, 
such an extension “would encounter a vagueness shoal.”155 Thus, the 
Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision in part, determining that 
“[b]ecause Skilling’s alleged misconduct entailed no bribe or kickback, 
it d[id] not fall within § 1346’s proscription.”156 
                                                                                                                     
not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 371. Section 1343 provides in part that anyone 
who has devised “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,” and who “transmits . . . by 
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any 
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
Finally, § 1346 states that “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to 
defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest 
services.” 18 U.S.C. § 1346. 
 147. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2901. 
 148. See id. at 2912. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2925. 
 151. See id. at 2935. 
 152. Id. at 2932; see also Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 251, 252 (2010). 
 153. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928; see also U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter 
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973) (“As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, 
but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional 
limitations.”); United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (noting “[t]he 
strong presumptive validity that attaches to an Act of Congress”). 
 154. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928. 
 155. Id. at 2907. 
 156. Id. 
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Similarly, in United States v. Moore,157 the D.C. Circuit considered 
whether sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for 
making a materially false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001(a)(2), because he signed a false name on a U.S. Postal Service 
delivery form.158 The defendant admitted that he willfully signed a false 
name on the form, but argued that no rational factfinder “could have 
found the false name was ‘material’ to any matter within the jurisdiction 
of the federal Government.”159 The majority first held that a statement 
was material if it had a natural tendency to influence, or was “capable of 
influencing, either a discrete decision or any other function of the 
agency to which it was addressed.”160 It then upheld the defendant’s 
conviction, noting that “a statement need not actually influence an 
agency in order to be material; it need only have ‘a natural tendency to 
influence, or [be] capable of influencing’ an agency function or 
decision.”161 
Judge Brett Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion to discuss “one of 
the difficult issues that can arise in prosecutions under the ever-
metastasizing § 1001—namely, the mens rea requirements for the 
statute, which by its text proscribes only those false statements that are 
‘knowingly and willfully’ made.”162 Judge Kavanaugh explained that 
the defendant had been tried twice for various drug offenses, but both 
trials ended in a hung jury.163 Prior to the second trial, the government 
added a false statements charge under § 1001 based on the defendant’s 
signing of the wrong name on a U.S. Postal Service delivery form; this 
form “contained no warning that an inaccurate statement might be a 
crime.”164 At trial, the defense did not ask for an instruction regarding 
knowledge, and the government was not required to prove that the 
defendant knew of the criminality of his conduct.165 The defendant was 
convicted of the false statements charge and was sentenced to five years 
in prison on this count.166 
 In light of this case, Judge Kavanaugh noted that “§ 1001 
prosecutions can pose a risk of abuse and injustice” because this 
provision “applies to virtually any statement an individual makes to 
virtually any federal government official—even when the individual 
making the statement is not under oath (unlike in perjury cases) or 
                                                                                                                     
 157. 612 F.3d 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 158. Id. at 699–700. 
 159. Id. at 700. 
 160. Id. at 701.  
 161. Id. at 701–02 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)). 
 162. Id. at 702 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 163. See id.  
 164. Id. at 702–03. 
 165. Id. at 703. 
 166. Id. 
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otherwise aware that criminal punishment can result from a false 
statement.”167 Judge Kavanaugh therefore argued that requiring “proof 
that the defendant knew that making the false statement would be a 
crime” could “mitigate the risk of abuse and unfair lack of notice in 
prosecutions under § 1001 and other regulatory statutes.”168 In doing so, 
Judge Kavanaugh relied on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bryan v. 
United States169 and the Court’s subsequent decisions on point.170 
Nevertheless, Judge Kavanaugh agreed with the majority’s decision 
affirming the defendant’s conviction because the defendant never 
argued “that the term ‘willfully’ in § 1001 requires proof of the 
defendant’s knowledge of the law, and he did not challenge the jury 
instructions on that basis.”171 Judge Kavanaugh cautioned, however, 
that where the defendant raises the issue, it is likely that the district 
court would have to give “a willfulness instruction that requires proof 
that the defendant knew h[er] conduct was a crime,” and that, in other 
cases involving § 1001, where the government is unable to prove that 
the defendant knew of the unlawfulness of her conduct, “it would seem 
inappropriate and contrary to § 1001’s statutory text to impose criminal 
punishment.”172 
Additionally, in Flores-Figueroa v. United States,173 the Court 
considered whether a federal criminal statute forbidding “[a]ggravated 
identity theft,” which imposed “a mandatory consecutive 2-year prison 
term upon individuals convicted of certain other crimes if, during (or in 
relation to) the commission of those other crimes, the offender 
‘knowingly transferr[ed], possesse[d], or use[d], without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another person,’” required the 
government to show that the defendant knew that the “means of 
identification” belonged to “another person.”174 The defendant admitted 
that he had intended to obtain phony identification numbers, but denied 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Id.; see also United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 82 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (stating that § 1001 can be used to punish “the most casual false statements so long 
as they turned out, unbeknownst to their maker, to be material to some federal agency 
function . . . [making] ‘a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal 
law’” (quoting Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286 (1982))). 
 168. Moore, 612 F.3d at 703 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 169. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 n.9 (2007) (“[W]e have 
consistently held that a defendant cannot harbor such criminal intent unless he acted with 
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dixon v. United 
States, 548 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (holding that the term “willfully” “requires a defendant to have 
acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 171. Moore, 612 F.3d at 704 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 172. Id. 
 173. 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009). 
 174. Id. at 1888 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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having knowledge that the numbers actually belonged to another 
person.175 The Court agreed with the defendant and held that 
§ 1028A(a)(1) required the government to prove “that the defendant 
knew that the means of identification at issue belonged to another 
person.”176 This holding was premised on the basic rules of grammar 
and the most natural meaning of the statute’s plain language.177 
Moreover, Justice Samuel Alito pointed out in his concurring opinion 
that when interpreting a criminal statute like this one, “it is fair to begin 
with a general presumption that the specified mens rea applies to all the 
elements of an offense, but it must be recognized that there are instances 
in which context may well rebut that presumption.”178 In this case, 
Justice Alito pointed out that the government had not rebutted this 
presumption because it had “not pointed to contextual features that 
warrant[ed] interpreting [the aggravated identity theft statute] in a 
similar way” as the other statutes where the courts had held that the 
government did not need to prove the “knowingly” intent as to every 
element of the crime.179 
B.  The Constitutionality of the ACA’s Provisions Relating to Mens Rea 
and Sentencing 
The ACA’s clarification that health care fraud is a general intent 
crime greatly favors the government, which has shown an increased 
interest in pursuing this and other health care-related offenses.180 At the 
                                                                                                                     
 175. See id. at 1889. 
 176. Id. at 1894. 
 177. See id. at 1890–94. 
 178. Id. at 1895 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 179. Id. at 1896. 
 180. From 2008 until 2010, the government has been increasing the number of new 
criminal health care fraud investigations that it has opened. In 2008, for example, “U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices opened 957 new criminal health care fraud investigations involving 1,641 
potential defendants. Federal prosecutors had 1,600 health care fraud criminal investigations 
pending, involving 2,580 potential defendants, and filed criminal charges in 502 cases involving 
797 defendants.” THE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2008, at 1 
(2009), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2008.pdf. Additionally, 
“the Department of Justice (DOJ) opened 843 new civil health care fraud investigations and had 
1,311 civil health care fraud matters pending.” Id. By contrast, in 2010, the DOJ “opened 1,116 
new criminal health care fraud investigations involving 2,095 potential defendants. Federal 
prosecutors had 1,787 health care fraud criminal investigations pending, involving 2,977 
potential defendants, and filed criminal charges in 488 cases involving 931 defendants.” THE 
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND 
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 1 (2011), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2010.pdf. Further, the “DOJ opened 942 
new civil health care fraud investigations and had 1,290 civil health care fraud matters pending 
at the end of the fiscal year.” Id. 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss2/4
2012] TOWARD A SPECIFIC INTENT REQUIREMENT 473 
 
same time, the ACA has increased the sentences for these offenses. 
Several aspects of the changes brought about by the ACA are troubling. 
For example, it has overturned years of precedent with one fell swoop. 
Moreover, it has potentially exacerbated the vagueness of statutes 
relating to health care crimes. 
The constitutionality of the lowered intent standard in the anti-
kickback and health care fraud statutes will be analyzed in much the 
same way as the constitutionality of the honest services fraud statute, 
the FSA, and the aggravated identity theft statute. Although Congress 
appears to have “spoken clearly” in this case, the general intent 
requirement, when applied to the anti-kickback and health care fraud 
statutes, nevertheless leaves the statutes open to attack on charges of 
vagueness. 
Broadly speaking, the principles advanced in the ACA, specifically 
the reduction of the culpability requirement for several white collar 
crime statutes, may “undermine the moral basis of the criminal law.”181 
First, as some scholars have noted, this development “denies fair notice, 
invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and violates the 
separation of powers principle that has traditionally denied federal 
courts the power to make common law crimes.”182 As the Supreme 
Court held in Lanzetta v. New Jersey,183 “No one may be required at 
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands 
or forbids.”184 Additionally, in Grayned v. City of Rockford,185 the Court 
reasoned that  
because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful 
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of 
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know 
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague 
                                                                                                                     
 181. Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization 
and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1558 (1997); see also 
Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent 
Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 49 (1995) (asserting that “the 
normalizing power of the criminal law is enhanced when the law’s meaning can be easily 
ascertained” and that when courts are “satisfied that a criminal statute overcomes due process 
hurdles posed by allegations of vagueness and overbreadth,” they “will feel less compelled to 
incorporate gross generalizations about ‘traditional innocence,’ and the precise facts that are 
likely to be understood as putting average people ‘on notice’ when the fundamental question of 
legislative intent can be resolved by simpler means”). 
 182. Coffee, supra note 13, at 207. 
 183. 306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
 184. Id. at 453. 
 185. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).  
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laws may trap the innocent by not providing a fair warning.186 
Thus, persons should not be prosecuted if the statute allegedly 
proscribing their actions does not “give fair warning of the conduct that 
it makes a crime.”187 
Further, many scholars argue that there should be a close link 
between “the criminal law and behavior deemed morally culpable by 
the general community” because a substantial deviation between these 
two factors could threaten the legitimacy of the criminal law.188 To that 
end, the government must prove that the defendant had both an “evil-
meaning mind” and an “evil-doing hand.”189 One of the main functions 
served by this requirement is that persons who are reasonably mistaken 
about, or do not know, the law are not (unduly) punished. While it is 
difficult to argue that a person who has killed someone did not know 
that she was violating the law, it is easy to understand that a person who 
was fishing in a local lake without a license might not have known that 
she was committing a crime.190 When a statute—like the one 
criminalizing fishing without a license—prohibits conduct that a 
reasonable person would not know is unlawful, the mens rea 
requirement must compensate for the lack of fair notice. A heightened 
mens rea standard will ensure that only the person who knew that she 
was violating the statute would be punished. 
Additionally, a vague statute, according to some commentators, can 
be considered a “de facto delegation[] of criminalization authority to the 
courts” because courts must “provide the specificity the legislature has 
not.”191 This delegation of authority is problematic in several respects. 
First, because common law crimes typically do not provide fair 
notice,192 which reduces the likelihood of compliance and thereby 
diminishes the deterrent effect of the crime,193 most states have 
                                                                                                                     
 186. Id. at 108. 
 187. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964). 
 188. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 198. 
 189. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952); see also David C. Gray, 
Extraordinary Justice, 62 ALA. L. REV. 55, 59 (2010). 
 190. Cf. Donald Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1531, 1548–49 (2010) (describing “moral” wrongdoing, such as “hitting, stealing, or 
refusing to share an abundant good, for example” and conventional wrongdoing, such as 
“wearing pajamas to school or work, swearing, or eating lunch while standing up, for example” 
and comparing the distinction between these terms to “the legal distinction between acts that are 
traditionally described in legal parlance as mala in se and mala prohibita”). 
 191. Robinson, supra note 135, at 365. 
 192. Id. at 340; see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 25, 27 (1931) (reversing a 
conviction because the defendant did not have adequate notice that the term “motor vehicle” 
included airplanes). 
 193. See Robinson, supra note 135, at 340. 
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abolished common law crimes194 and federal law does not recognize 
them.195 Punishment for common law crimes can also be inconsistently 
applied due to their imprecision, leading to a lack of uniformity in the 
law and allowing for potential abuses of judicial discretion.196 Second, 
there is little need for courts to create law, given that this sphere is well-
controlled by the legislature. Third, the legislature is the preferred 
means of law creation, as opposed to the courts, because, at least under 
the traditional view, “legislatures . . . faithfully represent popular norms, 
and hence accurately define the universe of serious norm-breakers, 
while prudish old judges seek to impose their unrepresentative values 
on an unfortunate population.”197 Moreover, because the legislative 
branch is “most directly accountable to the people, only the legislature 
[can] validate the surrender of individual freedom necessary to [the] 
                                                                                                                     
 194. See id. at 339. 
 195. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements 
of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, 
which are solely creatures of statute.” (citing United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 
(1812))). 
 196. See Robinson, supra note 135, at 341; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 
(1974) (stating that vague statutory language “allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to 
pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for 
setting the standards of the criminal law”); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 
(1972) (“[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide 
explicit standards for those who apply them.”); Freedman v. Texaco Marine Servs., Inc., 882 F. 
Supp. 580 (E.D. Tex. 1995). The court explained the need for uniformity in legal terminology as 
follows: 
[W]hen the language being construed is subject to only one plausible 
interpretation or “fair reading,” uniformity of application and unanticipated 
costs will dwindle in significance. However, when the language is vague and 
subject to many reasonable interpretations, uniformity of application and the 
unanticipated costs associated with each interpretation will become more 
telling. 
Id. at 583–84; see also Brian C. Harms, Redefining “Crimes of Moral Turpitude”: A Proposal 
to Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 269–70 (2001) (“Because of concerns for lack of notice 
and uniformity, many people have raised challenges to the common law approach to defining 
‘crimes involving moral turpitude.’”); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the 
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 201, 214 (1985) (highlighting “the potential 
for arbitrary discriminatory enforcement of the penal law and the resort to legal formalism as a 
constraint against unbridled discretion” and noting that “[t]he risk involved is that judicial 
particularization of the broad rubrics of common-law authority will be too ‘subjective,’ too 
closely grounded in the facts of the case at hand, [and] insufficiently abstracted from the 
personal characteristics of the individual defendant”). 
 197. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
576 (2001); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the 
seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral 
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”). 
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formation of the social contract.”198 
Finally, vague criminal statutes may fail to deter criminal activity.199 
Specifically, as scholars have pointed out, “[w]hen the law is unclear, 
persons who are considering some action may not realize that they are 
in danger of violating criminal laws. In those circumstances, people do 
not stop to weigh the benefit of the conduct against the risk of being 
caught and punished.”200 Vagueness is particularly detrimental to white 
collar crime statutes, because conduct criminalized by these statutes “is 
often based on ethical lapses, betrayals of trust, and deceptions that are 
not always [understood to be] crimes.”201 Conversely, vague laws can 
over-deter by inhibiting persons from performing perfectly legal acts.202 
As Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out, in the First Amendment 
context, “When one must guess what conduct or utterances may lose 
him his position, one necessarily will ‘steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone . . . .’ For ‘[t]he threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost as 
potently as the actual application of sanctions.’”203 
The ACA creates problems for defendants not only in the guilt or 
innocence phase, but also in the penalty phase of the judicial process. It 
contains congressional mandates directing the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to issue guidelines containing more severe penalties for 
health care fraud.204 Considered on their own, the use of these mandates 
is problematic, as they undermine the Commission’s independent 
rulemaking authority to criminalize certain conduct and to impose 
minimum and maximum sentences for a variety of offenses.205 As the 
                                                                                                                     
 198. Jeffries, supra note 196, at 202. 
 199. Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar 
Criminal Law, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 591, 606 (2006). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1535, 1539 (2005) (“Uncertainty breeds caution and restraint. . . .[I]n some contexts 
uncertainty can over-deter useful activities.”). See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, 
Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) 
(discussing the impact of uncertain legal standards). 
 203. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 230 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 204. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10606(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 119, 1007 (2010). 
 205. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the Commission fills an important institutional role: 
It has the capacity courts lack to ‘base its determinations on empirical data and national 
experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate expertise.’” Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–09 (2007) (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (2007) 
(McConnell, J., concurring); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007). The Court 
articulated the role the Commission would play: 
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Supreme Court held in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,206 when Congress explicitly leaves a gap for an 
agency to fill, “there is an express delegation of authority to the 
agency.”207 
The mandates direct the Commission to amend the guidelines and 
policy statements that apply to individuals who have been convicted of 
federal health care offenses “involving [g]overnment health care 
programs to provide that the aggregate dollar amount of fraudulent bills 
submitted to the [g]overnment health care program shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of the amount of the intended loss by the 
defendant[.]”208 Further, the mandates require the Commission to 
amend the guidelines by instituting a scheme of offense level 
enhancements based upon the amount of loss involved in the federal 
health care fraud offense.209 A two-level enhancement would be 
imposed if the loss is between one and seven million dollars, a three-
level increase would be imposed if the loss is between seven and twenty 
million dollars, and a four-level increase would be imposed if the loss is 
not less than twenty million dollars.210  
Acting in accordance with the ACA, the Commission published a 
notice of its request for public comment211 to implement the ACA’s 
directives regarding health care fraud offenses.212 In giving effect to the 
ACA’s directives, the Commission proposed adding two provisions to 
§ 2B1.1, both of which would apply to cases “in which the defendant 
[was] convicted of a Federal health care offense involving a 
Government health care program.”213 The first provision consists of a 
set of sentence enhancements that would apply depending on the 
                                                                                                                     
The Commission’s work is ongoing. The statutes and the Guidelines 
themselves foresee continuous evolution helped by the sentencing courts and 
courts of appeals in that process. . . . The Commission will collect and examine 
the results. In doing so, it may obtain advice from prosecutors, defenders, law 
enforcement groups, civil liberties associations, experts in penology, and 
others. And it can revise the Guidelines accordingly. 
Id.; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (“[T]he Sentencing Commission 
remains in place, writing Guidelines, collecting information about actual district court 
sentencing decisions, undertaking research, and revising the Guidelines accordingly.”). 
 206. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 207. Id. at 843–44. 
 208. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1 (2011), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_2_A-C.pdf.  
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,927, 41,927 (July 19, 
2010). 
 212. Id. at 41,928. 
 213. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 208, at 2. 
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amount of loss, with the most significant difference from the directive 
being that “tiers of the enhancement [would] apply to loss amounts 
‘more than’ the specified dollar amounts rather than to loss amounts 
‘not less than’ the specified dollar amounts to ‘ensure reasonable 
consistency’ as required by the directive[s].”214 The second provision 
consists of a new special rule for determining intended loss in these 
types of cases. Pursuant to this rule, “the aggregate dollar amount of 
fraudulent bills submitted to the Government health care program shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of the amount of the intended loss, i.e., 
is evidence sufficient to establish the amount of the intended loss, if not 
rebutted.”215Additionally, the proposed amendment defines the terms 
“Federal health care offense” and “Government health care program” in 
the commentary to § 2B1.1.216 “Federal health care offense” is defined 
in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 24 to mean “a violation of, or a criminal 
conspiracy to violate (1) section 669, 1035, 1347, or 1518 of this title”; 
or “(2) section 287, 371, 664, 666, 1001, 1027, 1341, 1343, or 1954 of 
this title if the violation or conspiracy relates to a health care benefit 
program.”217 
“Government health care program,” in this context, means “any plan 
or program that provides health benefits, whether directly, through 
insurance, or otherwise, which is funded directly, in whole, or in part, 
by federal or state government.”218 Examples of such programs, 
according to the proposed amendment, include Medicare, Medicaid, and 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program.219 
Further, the proposed amendment changes the wording of 
Application Note 3(A) to § 3B1.2 (Mitigating Role) to state that a 
defendant who is accountable “for a loss amount under § 2B1.1 that 
greatly exceeds the defendant’s personal gain from a fraud offense, and 
who had limited knowledge of the scope of the scheme” can still be 
eligible for a mitigating role adjustment.220 Finally, the proposed 
amendment establishes that a person who commits the crime of making 
a false statement in connection with the marketing or sale of multiple 
employer welfare arrangements under ERISA, a new offense created by 
the ACA, can be imprisoned for a term of no more than ten years.221 
The proposed amendment raises several concerns. First, its 
treatment of the terms “loss” and “relevant conduct” is inconsistent with 
                                                                                                                     
 214. Id. at 1. 
 215. Id. at 2. 
 216. See id.  
 217. 18 U.S.C. § 24(a)(1)-(2) (2006). 
 218. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 208, at 2. 
 219. See id. 
 220. Id.  
 221. See id. 
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that used by the guidelines. Generally, loss and relevant conduct are 
relegated to the province of judicial determination and involve an in-
depth factual inquiry.222 As a post-Booker v. United States223 case 
stated, “The Guidelines do not present a single universal method for 
loss calculation under § 2B1.1—nor could they, given the fact-intensive 
and individualized nature of the inquiry.”224 However, the ACA’s 
directive states that prima facie evidence of the amount of intended loss 
is “the aggregate dollar amount of fraudulent bills submitted to the 
Government health care program.”225 Thus, it appears that the ACA is 
attempting to circumvent the traditional means of determining loss and 
relevant conduct through its directives. By way of a remedy, one 
commentator has suggested that the best practice would be to recognize 
that programs like Medicare and Medicaid pay only 80% of the amount 
billed (or the amount of the intended loss under the ACA),226 and that 
the fraud guidelines provide “myriad credits, offsets, and exclusions 
from the loss calculus.”227 Otherwise, when they go into effect, the new 
guidelines will likely lead to significant sentencing disparities and 
resulting litigation.228 
                                                                                                                     
 222. See United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 712 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When applying 
section 2B1.1(b)(1) to determine the amount of loss, the district court ‘need only make a 
reasonable estimate’ of the amount. The United States’s burden is to prove the amount of loss 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Isiwele, 635 F.3d 
196, 203 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting the need for a “fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry into the 
defendant’s intent in determining ‘intended loss’ for sentencing purposes” in the health care 
fraud context); United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 541 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Thus, where 
provided by the Guidelines, a district court may examine relevant conduct to determine the 
applicable Guidelines range, even if not captured as an element of the offense of conviction.”); 
United States v. Miller, 316 F.3d 495, 504 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the amount fraudulently 
billed to Medicare or Medicaid is “prima facie evidence of the amount of loss [the defendant] 
intended to cause,” but “the amount billed does not constitute conclusive evidence of intended 
loss; the parties may introduce additional evidence to suggest that the amount billed either 
exaggerates or understates the billing party’s intent”). 
 223. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Booker held that the guidelines were not binding on federal 
courts. Id. at 233–34; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing 
Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CAL. L. REV. 47, 90 (2011). 
 224. United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 225. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 208, at 2. 
 226. See United States v. Nachamie, 121 F. Supp. 2d 285, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“The 
intended loss figure is the capped amount that Medicare typically pays per procedure code, 
reduced by 20%.”). 
 227. Sale et al., supra note 130, at 23 (citation omitted).  
 228. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). The Court set out a non-
exhaustive list of requirements that sentencing courts must consider: 
Under the post-Booker federal sentencing system, . . . sentencing courts must 
take account of the general sentencing goals set forth by Congress, including 
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, providing restitution to victims, 
reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, 
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The sentencing aspects of the ACA also raise broad concerns. White 
collar offenders are generally less likely to recidivate.229 Thus, the 
ACA’s focus on retributive sentencing undermines the traditional 
sentencing paradigm, which balances a number of sentencing 
purposes,230 and may create unwarranted disparities between white 
                                                                                                                     
providing just punishment, affording adequate deterrence, protecting the public, 
and effectively providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training and medical care. 
Id. at 300 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. 
Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1267, 1319–20 n.139 (2006), explaining that the  
most notable effort to impose consistency on the litigation process is reflected 
in the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which required federal 
sentencing judges to consider the “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar conduct,” and required judges to follow, in most cases, the 
Sentencing Guidelines established by the United States Sentencing 
Commission, . . . 
but that the Supreme Court subsequently held that the Guidelines were “unconstitutional 
because they caused sentences to be increased on the basis of offense characteristics that were 
not found by a jury beyond reasonable doubt, and . . . that the Guidelines could not be treated as 
mandatory.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1326–27 (2005) 
(footnotes omitted). It has yet to be determined whether the implementation of the guidelines 
has aided in furthering uniformity among the district courts or has in fact increased sentencing 
disparities: 
The available evidence suggests that the guidelines have succeeded in reducing 
judge-to-judge disparity within judicial districts. On the other hand, researchers 
have found significant disparities between sentences imposed on similarly 
situated defendants in different districts and different regions of the country, 
and interdistrict disparities appear to have grown larger in the guidelines era, 
particularly in drug cases. The question of whether the guidelines reduced or 
exacerbated racial disparities in federal sentencing remains unresolved. 
Id. 
 229. See Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 731, 758 (2007) (“White collar offenders, especially those coming from the 
corporate arena, are usually first offenders. Additionally, there is little likelihood of recidivism. 
The individual seldom can resume a position of power that would allow for continued 
criminality of this nature.”); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE 
CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 30 (2004), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Publications/Recidivism/200405_Recidivi 
sm_Criminal_History.pdf (stating that the recidivism rate of persons convicted of fraud offenses 
is lower than that of persons convicted of drug trafficking, larceny, firearms, robbery, or any 
other offenses). 
 230. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007) (listing the factors that a district 
court must consider in sentencing a defendant, which include: (1) “the nature and circumstances 
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) the need for the sentence 
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collar defendants on a nation-wide basis.231 
Given the problems associated with the ACA provisions described 
above, as well as the increase in litigation concerning purportedly vague 
white collar crime statutes, it is likely that the aspects of the ACA 
touching on white collar crime will also come under fire. To avoid this 
result, Congress should overturn, or return to their previous state, those 
sections of the ACA that lower the intent requirements of the anti-
kickback and health care fraud statutes, as well as those that amend the 
federal sentencing guidelines as they pertain to individuals convicted of 
offenses related to any federal health care program. 
CONCLUSION 
Although federal courts have been preoccupied with the other 
provisions of the ACA, particularly the individual mandate requirement, 
there has been no examination of the provisions of the ACA that have 
lowered the intent requirement for several health care fraud statutes 
from specific intent to general intent and that have changed the 
sentencing guidelines as they relate to persons violating the relevant 
health care fraud laws. These provisions are consistent with the overall 
trend toward general intent, rather than specific intent, as a prerequisite 
to a finding of a violation of a particular statute proscribing a white 
collar crime. This Article describes the so-called “intent revolution” in 
the context of several white collar statutes, including those affected by 
the ACA, evaluates the pitfalls of a lowered intent requirement in white 
collar crime statutes, and calls upon Congress to overturn the portions 
of the ACA discussed herein. 
                                                                                                                     
(a) “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense”; (b) “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; (c) “to 
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”; and (d) “to provide the defendant with 
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in [the] 
most effective manner”; (3) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”; and (4) “the 
need to provide restitution to any victim” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))). 
 231. See James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 180 n.36 (2010) (“In 
considering the direction to avoid unwarranted disparities under 28 U.S.C. § 3353(a)(6), 
sentencing courts principally consider national disparities, not intra-case disparities.”).  
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